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SUPERVISORY COLLEGES: THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL
CRISIS AND IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISORY
COORDINATION
Duncan Alford
While the current financial crisis began in the United States, the crisis
quickly spread globally, causing decreases in gross domestic product and
employment levels around the world. The crisis has revealed numerous
weaknesses in the supervision and regulation of global banks and financial
institutions generally.2 National governments and international bodies also
recognized these weaknesses in the supervisory system of global financial
institutions and have begun to take steps to improve the system with the hope
of avoiding, or at least mitigating, future financial crises.3 One such weakness
has been the ineffective supervisory cooperation among national bank
supervisors related to cross-border financial institutions.4 As a result, several
international governmental organizations, national governments, and
commentators have called for the use of colleges of supervisors to supervise
* Associate Dean and Director of the Law Library, Associate Professor of Law, University of South
Carolina School of Law. Thanks to Constantine Pournaras for his able, diligent, and reliable research
assistance.
1 See Edward Hadas, Is the Crisis Over?, N.Y. TIMms, Apr. 22, 2009, at B2.
2 See Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Financial Regulation and Supervision After the Crisis:
The Role of the Federal Reserve (Oct. 23, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/bernanke20091023a.htm.
4 See Tom de Swaan, The Changing Role of Banking Supervision, FRBNY ECON. POL'Y REV., Oct.
2000, at 75, 77-79.
In a recent report, the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") encouraged the development of colleges
of supervisors regulating internationally active banks and suggested that these colleges be more inclusive to
avoid protectionist tendencies. Int'l Monetary Fund, Strategy, Policy & Review Dep't, Initial Lessons of the
Crisis for the Global Architecture and the IMF 10 (Feb. 18, 2009), available at http://www.imforg/extemall
np/pp/eng/2009/021809.pdf Ultimately, the IMF recommended a binding code of conduct for global banks but
recognized that this code is a political solution beyond the capacities of regulators or supervisors alone to
create. Id. The Financial Services Authority ("FSA") of the United Kingdom recently reviewed the causes of
the current financial crisis and made wide-ranging policy recommendations to improve financial regulation in
the United Kingdom, the European Union ("EU'), and globally. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., TURNER REvIEw: A
REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRisis (2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/
other/tumrner review.pdf In its March 2009 report, the FSA also recommended the use of colleges of regulators
as an improvement to the current system but noted that their benefit may be limited. Id. at 97.
The Group of Thirty in its 2009 report, Financial Reform: A Framework for Financial Stability,
stressed the need for national regulators to enhance existing mechanisms for international regulatory and
supervisory coordination. The report also mentioned the need for more formal regional mechanisms such as in
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global financial institutions, in particular, those systemically important
financial institutions that have been the recipients of government financial
support during the crisis.6 As French President Nicholas Sarkozy and British
Prime Minister Gordon Brown noted recently, "[b]etter regulation and
supervision are the means by which the risk to the taxpayer can be reduced for
the longer term."
This Article explores one tool used to improve the international legal
framework for financial supervision-the college of supervisors or supervisory
colleges for systemically important financial institutions. These ad hoc groups
are intended to improve the exchange of information among supervisors with
the goal of ensuring safe and sound banking practices, reducing the possibility
of governmental assistance to financial institutions, and building confidence
generally in the international financial system.8 The hope is that these colleges,
which meet on a regular basis to discuss the supervision of a particular
financial institution, will identify issues or problems early and can then address
them quickly and reduce the risk of a bail out or bank failure.9
The G-20 and the European Union ("EU") have been particularly active in
developing these colleges and codifying best practices for their operation. This
Article explores their recent actions and suggests that the colleges are a step
toward further global supervision of financial institutions with cross-border
operations. However, colleges of supervisors are a limited, incomplete
response to the inadequate coordination of supervision of global financial
institutions. International supervisory coordination is necessarily hindered
because each national supervisor will strive to minimize its use of taxpayer
resources to cover any losses from bank failures. An international regime for
the orderly winding up of insolvent banks is a necessary component of truly
effective international supervisory coordination.
the EU. THE GROUP OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY 11-12 (2009),
available at http://www.group30.org/pubs/recommendations.pdf In a 2008 report, The Structure of Financial
Supervision: Approaches and Challenges in a Global Marketplace, the Group of Thirty noted that colleges of
regulators "may indeed be good fora for more formalized information exchanges and cooperation between
home and host supervisors." THE GROUP OF THIRTY, THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION:
APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 48 (2008).
6 FIN. SERVS. AuTH., supra note 5, at 98-99.
7 Gordon Brown & Nicolas Sarkozy, For Global Finance, Global Regulation, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10,
2009, at A25.
8 See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 5, at 98.
9 Id. at 99.
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I. INAUSPICIOUS BEGINNINGS FOR COLLEGES OF SUPERVISORS-BANK OF
CREDIT AND COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL
Supervisory colleges were not first created as a result of the current
financial crisis. Financial supervisors have previously formed these groups to
monitor financial institutions with cross-border operations. 10 In the late 1980s,
a college of supervisors, including supervisory authorities from the United
Kingdom, Luxembourg, and other European nations, supervised the Bank of
Credit and Commerce International ("BCCI"), a bank with operations in
several dozen countries.11 However, this college proved ineffective as the bank
was ultimately liquidated because of internal fraudulent activities.12
In a coordinated action on July 5, 1991, regulators in eight nations closed
all the BCCI branches located within their jurisdictions.13 At the time BCCI
had total assets of approximately $20 billion and was operating in sixty-nine
countries, with the largest concentration of its deposits in the United
Kingdom.14 Due to the absence of any international law governing the closure
of an international bank, local regulators acted under separate national laws.15
By July 6, 1991, BCCI offices in eighteen countries either were closed or their
operations were restricted.16 The closure of BCCI branches continued for
several weeks, and by July 29, 1991, forty-four jurisdictions had closed BCCI
offices located within their borders. The immediate reason for the closure of
BCCI was the Bank of England's receipt of a June 1991 report prepared by
Price Waterhouse, the international accounting firm, which detailed massive
fraud committed by BCCI's senior managers.
10 See id. at 97.
11 AUSTIN MITCHELL ET AL., THE BCCI COVER-UP 28 (2001), available at http://visar.csustan.edu/aabal
BCCICOVERUP.pdf.
12 Duncan Alford, Basle Committee Minimum Standards: International Regulatory Response to the
Failure ofBCCI, 26 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L. & EcoN. 241, 259 (1992).
13 Id. at 258.
14 Id.
15 Id
16 Id. at 258-59.
17 Id. at 259.
Is Id. Through the mid-1980s, the treasury operations of BCCI suffered huge losses. Id. Senior managers
siphoned off deposits to cover these losses. If the depositors withdrew their money, then other deposits were
diverted to cover the losses. Id. This practice resulted in an endless series of fraudulent transactions. Id. The
report revealed that senior managers, board members, and representatives of major shareholders participated in
the fraud by making fictitious loans, failing to record deposits, and dealing in their own shares in order to
manufacture profits. Id. BCCI also used client names to trade on its own account. Id. BCCI managers hid the
losses caused by bad trades, unpaid loans, and fraudulent practices by shuttling assets between subsidiaries. Id.
In 1988 alone, BCCI subsidiaries paid each other $152 million in fee income. Id. Price Waterhouse is the
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Regulators in both the United States and England had been concerned
about the safety and soundness of BCCI for years before the bank was finally
closed.19 In February 1990, Price Waterhouse, BCCI's auditor, refused to sign
off on the BCCI financial statements for 1989 and subsequently reported to the
BCCI board and the Bank of England its concerns of fraud at BCCI.2 0 In April
1990, the Bank of England permitted the government of Abu Dhabi to increase
its investment in BCCI-in effect to bail out the bank.21 Six months later, in
October 1990, Price Waterhouse delivered to the BCCI board a follow-up to its
22April report, detailing the bank's massive loan problems.
To compensate for the lack of supervisory resources over BCCI, bank
regulators from the Cayman Islands, France, Hong Kong, Luxembourg, Spain,
Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom created a
college of supervisors in 1987 to coordinate their regulatory efforts over
BCCI.2 3 In the end, this scheme was an unworkable solution and allowed
supervisors to shift responsibility for any BCCI transgression among
themselves.24 No single supervisor had any incentive to supervise BCCI
properly, and the supervisors did not cooperate adequately among themselves
25in sharing information on BCCI operations. In a 2004 speech, Callum
McCarthy, then head of the Financial Services Authority ("FSA"), concluded
that "in some cases the resources [of a supervisor] are simply not up to the task
of acting as a home regulator for a large group[j" and in the case of BCCI,
"the resources then available in Luxembourg[J" the home regulator, were not
sufficient. 26
predecessor accounting firm to the current Big Four accounting firm, PricewaterhouseCoopers. Press Release,
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Donald Nicoliasen Named SEC Chief Accountant (Aug. 14, 2003), http://www.sec.
gov/news/press/2003-97.htm.
19 Alford, supra note 12, at 259. BCCI pleaded guilty in 1988 to charges of money laundering in Tampa,
Florida. Id. at 259-60. On June 12, 1989, the Federal Reserve Board ("FRB") issued a cease and desist order
requiring BCCI to strengthen its U.S. operations and to comply with currency reporting regulations. Id. at 260.
The FRB issued a second cease and desist order against BCCI on March 4, 1991, ordering it to strengthen the
funding of its U.S. agency offices. Id. at 259.
20 Id. at 260.
21 id
22 id.
23 Id. at 264.
24 id.
25 See id. at 263-64.
26 Callum McCarthy, Chairman, Fin. Serv. Auth., How Should International Financial Service
Companies Be Regulated? 13 (Sept. 22, 2004), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Library/
Communication/Speeches/2004/SP196.shtml.
60 [Vol. 24
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Following the failure of BCCI in 1991, European bank regulators
recognized the need to improve cooperation among supervisors of global
banks.27 Ad hoc arrangements-colleges of supervisors-were created as the
need arose to supervise banks with cross-border operations.28 A college of
supervisors was created to exchange information related to Citigroup,
Deutsche Bank, and HSBC. 2 9 The Federal Reserve Bank of New York is the
lead supervisor of Citigroup; the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority
("BaFin") in Germany takes the lead on Deutsche Bank; and the FSA in the
United Kingdom is the lead supervisor of HSBC.30 Supervisory authorities
from the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Canada, Hong Kong, and
Switzerland meet regularly to share information on HSBC.31 Every six months,
the Federal Reserve, the FSA, and the Swiss Banking Commission meet to
discuss the operations of UBS and Credit Suisse.32
II. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND COLLEGES OF SUPERVISORS
Even before the current crisis, supervisory authorities were utilizing
colleges as a tool to share prudential information on financial institutions with
cross-border operations.33 The EU has been particularly active in utilizing
colleges to supervise financial institutions operating in multiple member
states. 34
The Committee of European Banking Supervisors ("CEBS")35 consists of
the bank supervisory authorities of the EU member states and has the objective
to "foster supervisory convergence across the Community."36 In furtherance of
this objective, CEBS has been active in supporting the development of colleges
of supervisors of cross-border banks within the EU.37 In December 2007,
27 See Alford, supra note 12, at 266.
28 Comm. of European Banking Supervisors, Range of Practices on Supervisory Colleges and Home-
Host Cooperation I (Dec. 27, 2007), available at http://www.c-ebs.org/getdoc/93f97617-daff-4d96-8248-
b214e231c28c/CEBS-2007-75-(Range-of-practices)-final-(1).aspx [hereinafter CEBS, Range ofPractices].
29 See McCarthy, supra note 26, 5.
30 Id. 8.
31 Id. 24.
32 Id
33 See generally CEBS, Range ofPractices, supra note 28.
34 See generally id.
35 See generally Duncan E. Alford, The Lamfalussy Process and EU Bank Regulation: Another Step on
the Road to Pan-European Regulation?, 25 ANN. REv. BANKING & FiN. L. 389, 405-06 (2006).
36 Commission Decision 2009/78, Establishing the Committee of European Bank Supervisors, pmbl.,
13, 2009 O.J. (L 25) 23, 23-24.
37 See CEBS, Range ofPractices, supra note 28, T III.
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CEBS issued two documents, Range ofPractices on Supervisory Colleges and
Home-Host Cooperation38 and Template for a Multilateral Cooperation
Coordination Agreement on the Supervision ofXY Group,39 that provided non-
binding guidelines on the operation of colleges of supervisors.
The financial crisis has focused renewed attention on colleges of
supervisors as one of several tools to reduce risk within the international
financial system. CEBS updated both documents in January 2009 and provided
more specific detail on the operation of the college of supervisors. 40 In its
Colleges of Supervisors-10 Common Principles,41 CEBS provides that a
college of supervisors shall supervise any cross-border insurance group,
banking group, or financial conglomerate. 42 The colleges-flexible, permanent
fora for cooperation and coordination among financial supervisory
authorities-shall have agreements in place describing the cooperation
between the supervisors and the practical organization of the supervisory
activities of the financial institution.4 3 For banking groups, the consolidating
supervisor, as defined in the amended Capital Requirements Directive
("CRD"), shall initiate the cooperation process.4 The colleges shall also
promote harmonization of supervisory approaches and coordinate all major
supervisory decisions.45 In addition, the colleges shall plan and coordinate
38 id.
39 Comm. of European Banking Supervisors, Template for a Multilateral Cooperation and Coordination
Agreement on the Supervision of XY Group (Dec. 27, 2007), available at http://www.c-
ebs.org/getdoc/0cb8e434-764d-4530-9b09-a23b5bd25f99/CEBS-2007-177-rev-2-template-for-written-agre-
(1).aspx [hereinafter CEBS, 2007 Template]. The Template document was a form agreement, to be signed
among supervisors, regarding the organization of the colleges and setting forth how the supervisors will
interact with one another in supervising a particular bank. Id. I 6-7. The agreement goes into detail about the
exchange of information and communication within the group and sets forth responsibilities of each of the
regulators who are a party to the agreement. Id.
40 See generally Comm. of European Banking Supervisors, Template for a Multilateral Cooperation and
Coordination Agreement on the Supervision of XY Group (Jan. 27, 2009), available at http://www.c-
ebs.org/getdoc/aaafdb97-fl31-4af6-96b5-34720clbd2ad/CEBS-2007-177-rev-4-template-for-written-
agreement.aspx [hereinafter CEBS, 2009 Template].
41 Comm. of European Banking Supervisors, Comm. of European Ins. and Occupational Pensions
Supervisors & the Interim Working Committee on Fin. Conglomerates, Colleges ofSupervisors-10 Common
Principles 1 (Jan. 27, 2009), available at http://www.c-ebs.org/getdoc/aeecafla-81b5-476a-95dd-
599c5e967697/Clean-V3-formatted-CEBS-2008-124-CEIOPS-SEC-08-54-.aspx-2008-124-CEIOPS-SEC-08-
54-.aspx.
42 Id. 2, princ. 1.
43 Id. 2, princs. 2, 5.
44 Id. 2, princ. 6.
45 Id. 2, princ. 8.
62 [Vol. 24
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supervisory, on-site inspections and share the findings from such visits with
other members of the college.46
While not significantly different from the 2007 version, the 2009 Template
for a Multilateral Cooperation Coordination Agreement removes some
discretion given to the supervisor under the earlier agreement and requires
supervisors to cooperate more fully with their peers in the supervision of cross-
border banks.47 For instance, the new agreement adds a provision stating,
"Should the authorities in a College not reach an agreement, as foreseen by the
CRD the matter may be referred for mediation to the Committee of European
Banking Supervisors . . . ."48 In Section 7.2, which deals with information
sharing, the 2009 agreement deleted language that defined expectations of
timeliness.49 This change could be interpreted as not requiring timely responses
to requests for information.o
In January 2009, the European Commission arrived at a decision that
further strengthened CEBS's supervisory cooperation role in reconstituting
CEBS. The 2009 decision established that the Committee shall "mediate or
facilitate mediation between supervisory authorities in cases specified in the
relevant legislation or at the request of a supervisory authority."52 Under this
provision, CEBS is authorized to mediate between supervisors-authority it
did not have under the 2004 decision originally creating CEBS.53 Previously,
colleges of supervisors made all decisions by consensus and had no mechanism
to resolve conflicts other than by negotiation and mutual cooperation.54 At
least with respect to supervisory authorities within the EU, the 2009 decision
allowed CEBS to mediate these disputes.ss This decision also specifically
required CEBS to "contribute to ensuring the efficient and consistent
functioning of colleges of supervisors in particular through setting guidelines
46 Id. 2, princ. 9.
47 Compare CEBS, 2007 Template, supra note 39, 6, 6.1, with CEBS, 2009 Template, supra note 40,
6, 6.1.
48 CEBS, 2009 Template, supra note 40, 6.1(26).
49 Compare CEBS, 2007 Template, supra note 39, 7.2(56), with CEBS, 2009 Template, supra note 40,
7.2.
50 Cf CEBS, 2009 Template, supra note 40, 7.2 (omitting any reference to timeliness).
51 See generally Commission Decision 2009/78, supra note 36. This 2009 decision repealed the 2004
decision initially establishing the Committee of European Banks Supervisors ("CEBS"). Id. at 25.
52 Id. art. 4(1).
53 Compare id., with Commission Decision 2004/10, Establishing the Committee of European Banking
Supervisors, 2004 O.J. (L 3) 28 (EC).
54 See CEBS, 2007 Template, supra note 39, 4.
55 Commission Decision 2009/78, supra note 36, art. 4(1)(a).
2010] 63
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for the operational functioning of colleges, monitoring the coherence of the
practices of different colleges and sharing best practices."56 Now, CEBS is
authorized to ensure that colleges of supervisors apply EU law, implement
measures consistently across financial institutions, and ensure that cross-border
banks are supervised consistently by colleges of supervisors with varying
membership.s7
The EU has taken additional steps to buttress colleges as a supervisory
tool.58 In several EU directives, the EU institutionalized greater cooperation
among supervisors monitoring cross-border banks.59 With the adoption of the
Basel II directive dealing with capital requirements of credit institutions,60 the
EU specifically created rules dealing with cooperation among supervisors of
cross-border banks operating in the EU.61 In its proposal for Basel II,62 the
European Commission noted that the establishment of colleges of supervisors
would "facilitate the tasks of the consolidating supervisor and the host
supervisors.6 Chapter 4 (Articles 124 through 144) of this directive provides
rules to determine which supervisor, also known as the lead supervisor,
64
exercises consolidated supervision over the cross-border bank. Within
Chapter 4, Articles 125 and 126 set forth detailed rules identifying the lead
supervisor, depending on the structure of the credit institution and its
relationship to any parent financial holding company.65 The membership of the
college includes supervisors from all EU member states where the credit
institution has a subsidiary.66 Article 126(3)-(4) provides that supervisors may
waive these rules, appoint a lead supervisor selected among themselves to
56 Id. art. 4(1)(e).
57 CEBS, 2007 Template, supra note 39, IM 5(21), 7.3(58). On December 17, 2009, CEBS issued a
consultation paper on guidelines for the operational functioning of colleges of supervisors. See CEBS,
Consultation Paper on CEBS's Guidelines for the Operational Functioning of Colleges (Dec. 17, 2009),
available at http://www.c-ebs.org/documents/Publications/Consultation-papers/2009/CP34/CP34.aspx
[hereinafter CEBS Consultation Paper].
58 See, e.g., Council Directive 2006/48,2006 O.J. (L 177) 1 (EC).
59 See id.; Council Directive 2006/49, 2006 O.J. (L 177) 201 (EC).
60 BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISORS, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL
MEASUREMENT: CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEwoRK 12-14 (2004) [hereinafter BASEL II].
61 Id. at 168-69.
62 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directives
2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as Regards Banks Affiliated to Central Institutions, Certain Own Funds Items,
Large Exposures, Supervisory Arrangements, and Crisis Management, at 3, COM (2008) 602, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal market/bank/docs/regcapital/crdproposal en.pdf
63 Id. at 9.
64 Council Directive 2006/48, supra note 58, arts. 124-44.
65 Id. arts. 125-26.
66 Id. art. 131.
64 [Vol. 24
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supervise the credit institution, and notify the Commission of such
appointment.67 In addition, Article 131 of the Third Capital Requirements
Directive requires that supervisors "shall have written coordination,
cooperation agreements in place."68 Within the EU, these colleges carry out the
tasks set forth in the CRD and are generally limited to regulating capital
69
requirements of financial institutions. In practice, colleges of supervisors may
expand their purview to include other supervisory matters.70
One weakness of the college of supervisors, under these directives, is the
lack of a mandatory mediation process if the supervisors cannot agree on an
action with respect to the supervision of the financial institution. As seen in
the current financial crisis, this lack of mediation allowed supervisors to act on
72their own and not in coordination with their peers. For example, in the fall
2008 rescue of Fortis, the financial group with investors in Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Luxembourg,7 3 the national supervisors struggled to
coordinate their actions.74 At first, the Benelux governments purchased 49% of
the common equity of Fortis.75 A few days later, the Dutch government seized
the Dutch operations of Fortis, and the Belgian and Luxembourgian operations
76
were sold to BNP Paribas, a private bank. These events illustrate a lack of
effective supervisory cooperation, particularly during times of crisis.
Recognizing the weaknesses in the supervisory system highlighted by the
67 Id. art. 126(3)-(4).
68 Id. art. 131.
69 Id. arts. 124-44.
70 See CEBS Consultation Paper, supra note 57, at 3. The proposed guidelines describe activities of
colleges that go beyond the regulation of capital and include analyzing macroprudential risks to the financial
institution and developing a coordinated supervisory response in the event of an emergency. Id. at 6, 49-54.
71 See Council Directive 2006/48, supra note 58, arts. 124-44; Council Directive 2006/49, supra note 59.
72 See Nikki Tait & Jennifer Hughes, Trichet Calls for Supervision ofAll Institutions, FiN. TIES, Feb.
24,2009, at 7; Ulrich Volz, Europe Needs a United Approach to the Credit Crunch, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 2008,
at A27.
73 Press Release, Fortis, Governments of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands Invest EUR 11.2
Billion in Fortis (Sept. 29, 2008), available at http://www.holding.fortis.com/Documents/UK PRFortis
29092008.pdf.
74 Tait & Hughes, supra note 72, at 7; Press Release, Fortis, Governments of Belgium, Luxembourg, and
the Netherlands Invest EUR 11.2 Billion in Fortis, supra note 73.
7 Press Release, Fortis, Governments of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands Invest EUR 11.2
Billion in Fortis, supra note 73.
76 Volz, supra note 72, at A27.
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financial crises, the EU responded with legislative proposals to reform the
system within the EU.n
III. THE EUROPEAN UNION'S REFORM OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION 78
On February 23, 2009, the High-Level Group of advisors, chaired by
Jacques de Larosibre, former Governor of the Banque de France, issued its
report on the reform of the EU system of financial supervision, also known as
the Larosibre Report.79 Appointed by Jos6 Manuel Barroso, the President of the
European Commission, in the fall of 2008, the High-Level Group was charged
with a broad mandate: "to make proposals to strengthen European supervisory
arrangements covering all financial sectors, with the objective to establish a
more efficient, integrated and sustainable European system of supervision."80
A complete analysis of this Report is beyond the scope of this Article, which
will focus on the Report's recommendations related to supervisory cooperation
within the EU. The Larosi&e Report recommended that the colleges of
supervisors, introduced by the amended CRD and the then-proposed Solvency
II Directive, should take the lead in supervising cross-border institutions.81 The
Report went on to suggest that colleges of supervisors should be strengthened
by "participation of representatives of the secretariat of the Level 3 committees
as well as of [the European Central Bank and European System of Central
Bank] observers." 82 The Larosibre Report, in Recommendation 18, advised
that "colleges of supervisors would be set up for all major cross-border
institutions."83
77 JACQUES DE LAROSIERE ET AL., THE HIGH-LEVEL GRoUP ON FINANCIAL SUPERVIsION IN THE EU 15-
27 (2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/economyfinance/focuson/crisis/documents/de larosiere report en.
pdf [hereinafter LAROSIERE REPORT].
78 A timeline of the current effort to reform the EU legal framework for financial supervision is attached
as Annex A.
79 LAROSIERE REPORT, supra note 77. This group held eleven public meetings and consulted widely to
develop its thirty-one recommendations to improve financial services regulation within the EU. Id. at 19-68,
70.
8o Press Release, High Level Expert Group on EU Financial Supervision to Hold First Meeting on 12
November (Nov. 11, 2008), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1679
&format-HTML&aged=0&1anguage=EN&guiLanguage-en.
8 LARoswRE REPORT, supra note 77, at 47. The Solvency II Directive was enacted later. Council
Directive 2009/138, 2009 O.J. (L 335) 1 (EC).
82 LARosWRE REPORT, supra note 77, at 47. The Level 3 committees refer to the CEBS, the Committee
of European Securities Regulators ("CESR"), and the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational
Pension Supervisors ("CEIOPS"). Id. at 70. These committees were set up under the Lamfalussy process to
advise the Commission and its committees on implementing measures needed to effectuate financial
regulation. See generally Alford, supra note 35, 397-406.
83 LARosWRE REPORT, supra note 77, at 48.
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The Report also stated the "relatively restrictive use of supervisory colleges
should be expanded immediately." 84 The Report suggested that by the end of
2009, supervisory colleges should be established for all major cross-border
firms within the EU, estimated to be at least fifty financial institutions.86 The
Level 3 committees8 would participate in this process by defining the final
supervisory practices and arrangements for the functioning of the colleges of
supervisors.8 8 The clear intent of the Report is to expand the mandate of
CEBS-to be more inclusive of the supervisory players and to broaden the
tasks of colleges beyond those stated in the CRD. This recommendation is a
logical precursor to the Report's medium-term goal of creating a European
System of Financial Supervisors ("ESFS"). 89 The ESFS would transform the
Level 3 committees into three supervisory authorities, one for each financial
sector: banking, securities, and insurance.90 The authorities are tasked to ensure
"consistency of prudential supervision" 91 and to define "common supervisory
practices and arrangements for the functioning of the colleges of
supervisors."92
The European Council of the EU93 took up the Larosi&re Report at its
March 2009 meeting.94 The European Council "agreed on the need to improve
the regulation and supervision of financial institutions in the EU and that the
Report from the High-Level Group on financial supervision chaired by Jacques
de Larosi&re is the basis for action." 95
84 Id. at 51.
85 id.
86 Id. at 51 n. 13. See Annex B attached for a list of systemically important financial institutions that the
Financial Stability Board purportedly compiled in November 2009.
87 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
88 LARosWRE REPORT, supra note 77, at 52. The Larosi&re Report envisioned that the Level 3
committees under the Lamfalussy process would eventually become European authorities or regulatory
agencies-the European Banking Authority, the European Insurance Authority, and the European Securities
Authority. Id. at 53, 55. See supra notes 35-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the best practice
documents issued by CEBS on the operation of colleges of supervisors.
89 LAROSlIRE REPORT, supra note 77, at 52-55.
90 Id. at 55.
91 Id at 53.
92 Id.
93 The European Council, consisting of the heads of state of the member states of the EU, meets
quarterly. The Institutions of the Union: The European Council, available at http://europa.eu/scadplus/
constitution/europeancouncil en.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
94 For a timeline of events, see Annex A.
95 Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council (Mar. 20, 2009), available at http://www.
consilium.europa.euluedocs/cms data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/106809.pdf
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In May 2009, the European Commission issued a communication
describing its planned actions based on the Larosibre Report,96 calling for
comments from interested parties during a consultation period, and setting
forth a revision of the European supervisory structure based on two pillars: (1)
the creation of a European Systemic Risk Council ("ESRC") to deal with
macroprudential supervision and (2) the creation of the ESFS to deal with
microprudential supervision, that is, supervision of individual financial
institutions.97 The ESFS is charged with developing a "harmonized core set of
standards" 9 8 and "a common supervisory culture." 99 The Commission's
legislative proposals go beyond the framework developed at the G-20 summits
discussed below and create an integrated financial supervisory structure within
the EU.100
The Commission stated that the current Level 3 committees must move
beyond being advisory bodies and should become European supervisory
authorities with legal personalities and additional powers and
responsibilities. 101 As part of the ESFS, the Commission proposed creating
three new supervisory authorities-the European Banking Authority ("EBA"),
the European Securities Authority ("ESA"), and the European Insurance and
Occupational Pensions Authority ("EIOPA").102 This Article focuses on the
EBA. The additional powers given to the EBA include "develop[ing] binding
technical standards," 103  drafting "interpretative guidelines," 104  settling
"[d]isagreement[s] between national supervisors"10 5 (including within colleges
of supervisors), issuing recommendations to national supervisors on prudential
matters, issuing decisions directly to financial institutions in the event that a
national supervisor does not comply, 106 "[e]nsur[ing] a common supervisory
culture," 107 "[e]nsur[ing] a coordinated response"108 by supervisors in the event
96 Communication from the Commission: European Financial Supervision, COM (2009) 252 final (May
27,2009).
97 Id. at 3.
9' Id. at 4.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id at 8-9.
102 Id. at 8.
103 Id. at 9.
104 id
105 Id at 10.
106 Id
107 Id. at 11.
10 d
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of a crisis, and "[c]ollect[ing] microprudential information" on financial
institutions.109
The May communication relies heavily on colleges of supervisors as "the
lynchpin of the supervisory system"110 as they will "ensur[e] a balanced flow
of information between home and host authorities."" The EBA will
participate in the colleges as an observer,112 Will ensure that colleges use
consistent practices in supervising financial instructions,113 and will facilitate
the distribution of microprudential information to all national supervisors in a
particular college.114 The expectation is that the college will take an institution-
wide view regarding prudential supervision, rather than just a national view.
The European Commission highlights that the participation of the EBA in
colleges is not a "'Europeanisation' of all financial supervision."
116
Subsequently, in June 2009, the Council of Economic and Finance
Ministers ("ECOFIN Council") approved the May communication and the
creation of both the ESRC and the ESFS.117 However, the ECOFIN Council
stressed that any action by the new European supervisory authorities "should
not impinge on the fiscal responsibilities of the Member States."118 The
ECOFIN Council stated that "a common supervisory culture" will be
developed because of the EBA's participation in the colleges of supervisors.119
The EBA would collect microprudential information and create a central
database of this information available to the relevant supervisors of a particular
financial institution.120 The ECOFIN Council acknowledged the role of the
109 Id.
110 Id. at 9.
111 Id.
112 Press Release, European Union, Fin. Supervision-Frequently Asked Questions 6 (May 27, 2009),
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/09/251&format-HTML&aged=
0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (follow "PDF: EN" hyperlink).
113 Id. at 3.
114 Communication from the Commission: European Financial Supervision, supra note 96, at 11.
1 See id at 9 ("[T]he ESFS will combine the advantages of an overarching European framework for
financial supervision with the expertise of local supervisory bodies.").
116 Press Release, European Union, Fin. Supervision-Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 112, at 4.
1 See Press Release, Council of the European Union, Econ. & Fin. Affairs 8-11 (June 9, 2009),
available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofm/108392.pdf
(describing proposed roles for the ESRC and ESFS).
118 Press Release, Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Strengthening EU Fin.
Supervision 4 (June 9, 2009), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms Data/docs/pressdata/
en/ecofin/108389.pdf.
119 Id.
120 id
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European supervisory authorities as mediators in disputes between national
supervisors over prudential matters but stated that this "power[] should not
impinge in any way on Member States' fiscal responsibilities."121 The
members of the ECOFIN Council, particularly the United Kingdom, were
concerned that these new European agencies could require a member state to
bail out a bank or other financial institution against its will.12 2
In parallel to the legislation based on the Larosi&re Report, the EU
considered and enacted changes to the Third Capital Requirements Directivel23
with respect to the formation of colleges of supervisors to supervise financial
institutions operating across borders in the EU. The amended CRD requires
consolidating supervisors to create colleges of supervisors.124 Under the CRD,
colleges can exchange information about financial institutions, voluntarily
delegate supervisory tasks and responsibilities among themselves, and develop
a "supervisory examination programme[]" for the financial institution for
which they are responsible.125 Members of the college are supervisors from a
member state where a subsidiary is located or which contains significant
branches of the financial institution.126 Previously, member states where
significant branches were located did not have the right to participate in
colleges of supervisors.127 The consolidating supervisor chairs the college,
selects the participating supervisors, and notifies CEBS (or the EBA once it is
created) of the college's activities, subject to any confidentiality agreements. 128
In September 2009, the European Commission proposed three regulations
creating the European supervisory authorities discussed in its May 2009
communication and originally proposed by the Larosi&re Report.129 Member
states reviewed the proposal,130 and negotiations began among the member
121 Id. at 5.
122 EU Finance Chiefs Tackle Latvia, BBC NEWS, June 9, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8090824.stm.
U.K. City Minister Lord Myners was quoted as saying that "[n]ational supervision must be pre-eminent when
the cost of failure of an institution lies with the taxpayer." Id.
123 Council Directive 2009/111, 2009 O.J. (L 302) 97 (EC).
124 Id. pmbl., 33.
125 id.
126 id.
127 See Council Directive 2006/48, supra note 58, arts. 42-43.
128 Council Directive 2009/111, supra note 123, pmbl., 33.
129 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council Establishing a
European Banking Authority, at 2-11, 13-14, 21, COM (2009) 501 final (Sept. 23, 2009), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0501:FIN:EN:PDF [hereinafter Proposed
Regulation].
130 See HOUSE OF COMMONS TREASURY COMMITTEE, 16TH REPORT OF SESSION2008-2009, COMMITTEE'S
OPNION ON PROPOSALS FOR EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SUPERVISION, 2008-2009, H.C. 1088, at 10-16
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states about the proposed legislation. There was particular concern about the
powers of the European supervisory authorities to issue binding decisions that
may require member states to bail out a financial institution or to issue a
decision directly to a financial institution and, in effect, bypass the national
*131
supervisor.
At its December 2009 meeting, the ECOFIN Council did approve the three
regulations creating the European supervisory authorities but with significant
changes to the European supervisory authorities' powers. 132 In this Article, I
focus on the changes in the regulation creating the EBA.133 The ECOFIN
Council's compromise significantly weakened the decision-making powers of
the European supervisory authorities. Again, some member states, particularly
the United Kingdom, were concerned about the possibility of an EU institution
requiring the member state to use taxpayer money to bail out a financial
institution against its will.134 Given London is the largest financial center in
Europe, the United Kingdom was particularly concerned about this
possibility.135 With these amendments, the ECOFIN Council authorized the
European Presidency to negotiate with the European Parliament to enact
legislation on first reading that would allow the European supervisory
authorities to become operational sometime in 2010.136
This legislation does improve, to a limited extent, the financial supervisory
system in the EU. The EBA can issue binding technical standards, subject to
review by the European Commission.137 However, according to the amended
regulation, the standards shall not include public policy choices,138 an
[hereinafter HOUSE OF COMMONS TREASURY COMMITTEE]; HOUSE OF COMMONS EUROPEAN SCRUTINY
COMMITTEE, 32D REPORT, ANNEX: EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SUPERVISION-DELEGATING POWER TO
COMMUNITY AGENCIES AND LEGAL BASES FOR DOING So, 2008-2009, H.C. 19-xxx, at 15.
131 Stephen Castle, E.U. Solves Financial Rule Deadlock, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 3, 2009, at 16; see
HOUSE OF COMMONS TREASURY COMMITTEE, supra note 130, at 23-27, 29-34.
132 Compare Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a
European Banking Authority, COM (2009) 501 final (Sept. 23, 2009) [hereinafter EBA Regulations], with
Proposed Regulation, supra note 129.
133 See generally EBA Regulations, supra note 132.
134 See Castle, supra note 131, at 16.
135 id
136 Council Conclusions EUCO 6/09 of 11 Dec. 2009, at 5, available at http://ec.europa.eu/intemal
market/finances/docs/committees/supervision/20090923/com2009 501 en.pdf
137 See EBA Regulations, supra note 132, 14, at 15 (indicating the need to create technical standards that
the Commission should endorse); Proposed Regulation, supra note 129, arts. 6(1)(a), 6(2)(a), 7 (indicating the
need for technical standards, that the European supervisory authorities should have the power to propose them,
and that they will be binding upon approval by the Commission).
138 EBA Regulations, supra note 132, art. 7(1), at 24.
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ambiguous phrase that limits EBA discretion. The EBA Board of Supervisors
must approve any standards by qualified majority voting.139 The revised
regulation continues the EBA's role in a college of supervisors140 and
encourages the development of a common reporting format of prudential
information.141 The EBA is an observer in all colleges of supervisors and is
obligated to create a central system for the collection of prudential information
on financial institutions.142 The EBA can settle disputes among supervisors.143
To ensure its independence, the EBA has a separate budget, financed by the
EU's general budget and member states.144
As a result of the political compromise, the regulation has significant
weaknesses and falls short of the goals set forth in the May communication and
the Larosi&re Report. In particular, the compromise weakened the
independence of the EBA. The EBA cannot issue a binding decision directly to
a financial institution,145 a power the European Commission proposed and that
is typical of national supervisory authorities.146 A declaration of a financial
emergency by the ECOFIN Council triggers additional powers of the EBA.147
Under the Commission proposal, the European Commission could declare such
an emergency.148 The directive includes a safeguard provision that weakens the
EBA's power vis-A-vis member states and repeats the June 2009 statement by
the ECOFIN Council that the EBA decisions should not impinge on the fiscal
responsibilities of a member state in any way.149 A member state can appeal
any decision of the EBA to the ECOFIN Council.150 During the appeal, the
EBA decision is not implemented. The ECOFIN Council must maintain the
decision (e.g. take an affirmative action to approve it), or the decision is
139 Id. art. 29, at 36. Qualified majority voting is the method of voting used for approval of most EU
legislation by the Council of Ministers. See generally Council of the European Union, http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=242&lang-en (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).
140 EBA Regulations, supra note 132, 23, at 17.
141 Id. 31,at 18.
142 Id. art. 12(3), at 28.
143 Id. art. 11, at 27.
144 Id. 50, at 21.
145 Id. arts. 6(2)(c), 9(3), 10(2), at 24-26 (stating that the European supervisory authorities may issue
recommendations to competent authorities or the Commission but cannot issue decisions directly to a financial
institution).
146 See Proposed Regulation, supra note 129, arts. 10(3), 11(4). Articles 10(3) and 11(4) from the
Proposed Regulation were both deleted by the Council. Id.
147 See EBA Regulations, supra note 132, art. 10, at 26-27.
148 Proposed Regulation, supra note 129, art. 10(1).
149 Id. art. 23(1).
150 Id. art. 23(2).
151 id
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terminated.152 During an emergency declared by the ECOFIN Council, a
member state may appeal an EBA decision to the ECOFIN Council and the
decision is suspended. 153 If the ECOFIN Council does not revoke the decision,
the suspension of the decision is terminated.154 Even then, a member state has
the right to request the ECOFIN Council to re-examine its decision. ss Through
the appeals process, the ECOFIN Council can overrule any decision by the
EBA for any reason.156 While any EBA decision would generally be subject to
judicial review by the European Court of Justice, this review by the ECOFIN
Council significantly undermines the independence of the EBA.
This regulation has not yet been finally enacted. Because the legal basis for
the regulation is Article 95 of the Treaty of Lisbon,157 dealing with the internal
market, 158 it is subject to the co-decision procedure and must go before the
European Parliament for approval.159 Promptly after the ECOFIN Council
meeting in December 2009, four political parties that represent a vast majority
of the members of the European Parliament issued a press release stating that
they will not approve a "water[ing] down" of the financial supervision
legislation.160 The European Parliament will likely propose some amendments
to this compromise. In its first reading of the European Commission's May
2009 communication, the Parliamentary report commented that this legislation,
and particularly the use of supervisory colleges, was "a phase in a development
towards further regulatory convergence and supervisory integration."1 61
152 id
153 Id. art. 23(3).
154 id
155 Id. art. 23.
156 id
157 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European
Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1.
158 Proposed Regulation, supra note 129, pmbl., 10.
159 Id. pmbl.
160 Press Release, The Greens/Eur. Free Alliance, Fin. Supervision: European Parliament Will Not Agree
to Water Down the New European Authorities (Dec. 2, 2009), available at http://www.greens-efa.org/
cms/pressreleases/dok/317/317452.financial supervision@en.htm. While this Article is based on research
completed through December 2009, the European Parliament on February 10, 2010, issued a draft report that
amends significantly the regulation creating the EBA and the other supervisory authorities. See European
Parliament, Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, Draft Report on the Proposal for a Regulation of
the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a European Banking Authority, 2009/0142(COD)
(Feb. 10, 2010), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+
COMPARL+PE-438.408+01+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&1anguage=EN.
161 Position of the European Parliament Adopted at First Reading on 6 May 2009, EuR. PARL. Doc. EP-
PE TC1-COD (2008) (0191) 7 (2009).
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IV. G-20 SUMMITS
Like the EU, the G-20162 has also recommended the expanded use of
colleges of supervisors to supervise systemically important financial
institutions. To address the financial crisis, the leaders of the G-20 nations met
in Washington, D.C. in November 2008. The G-20 in its communiqu6 at the
end of this summit on financial markets and the world economy noted the
importance of the use of colleges of supervisors to enhance supervisory
cooperation related to global banks. This joint communiqu6 stated that by
March 31, 2009,
[s]upervisors should collaborate to establish supervisory colleges for
all major cross-border financial institutions, as part of efforts to
strengthen the surveillance of cross-border firms. Major global banks
should meet regularly with their supervisory college for
comprehensive discussions of the firm's activities and assessment of
the risks it faces. 163
The countries at the Washington Summit in 2008 agreed to meet again in
London by April 30, 2009, to review the implementation of these principles
and decisions. 164
In preparation for the London Summit, finance ministers and central bank
governors of the G-20 met in the United Kingdom in March 2009.165 During
their meeting they reiterated the importance of supervisory coordination
stating: "Given the interconnectedness of the global financial system,
international cooperation is important to maximise the effectiveness of these
measures and reject financial protectionism."166 This same group in their
communique stated that the Financial Stability Forum ("FSF") should expand
its role to ensure that "all systemically important financial institutions, markets
and instruments are subject to an appropriate degree of regulation and
162 The following countries are members of the G-20: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China,
France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South
Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. G-20, What is the G-20, http://www.g20.org/
about what is_g20.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).
163 G-20, Declaration, Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy (Nov. 15, 2008), available
athttp://www.g20.org/Documents/g20 summit declaration.pdf
164 Id
165 G-20, Communiqu6 Annex, Restoring Lending: A Framework for Financial Repair and Recovery
(Mar. 14,2009), available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/2009 communique annex horsham uk.pdf
166 Id para. 1.
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oversight" 167 and to strengthen "international cooperation to prevent and
resolve crises, including through supervisory colleges."1 68
During the London Summit on April 2, 2009, G-20 leaders themselves
agreed "to establish the much greater consistency and systemic cooperation
between countries, and the framework of internationally agreed high standards,
that a global financial system requires." 169 The G-20 leaders affirmed their
finance ministers' recommendation and established the Financial Stability
Board ("FSB"), as successor to the FSF,170 with the goal of extending
"regulation and oversight to all systemically important financial institutions,
instruments and markets."171 They also emphasized the use and development
of colleges of supervisors in supervising global banks.172 Furthermore, the FSB
would expand its membership to include all G-20 countries, FSF members,
173
167 G-20, Communiqud, Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors para. 6 (Mar. 14,
2009), available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/2009 communique horsham uk.pdf.
168 Id.
169 G-20, Communiqu6, The Global Plan for Recovery and Reform para. 14 (Apr. 2, 2009), available at
http://www.g20.org/Documents/final-communique.pdf
170 In 2008, in two separate reports, the Financial Stability Forum ("FSF") had recommended the
expanded use of colleges of supervisors. In its April 2008 report entitled Report of the Financial Stability
Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience, the FSF recommended that all global banks be
supervised by a college of supervisors that should build on existing examples of supervisory colleges both in
the Basel II framework and in regional arrangements, such as within the EU. The purpose of the colleges is to
enhance cooperation on supervisory issues, and each college would be organized differently depending on the
structure of the global bank it was supervising. Similarly, the forum recommended that by 2009 the colleges
should conduct an exercise to draw lessons about best practices of colleges of supervisors. FIN. STABILITY
FORUM, REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM ON ENHANCING MARKET AND INSTITUTIONAL
RESILIENCE 42 (2008), available at http://www.fmancialstabilityboard.org/publications/r 0804.pdf
In October 2008, the FSF updated its April 2008 report on how supervisors had implemented its
extensive recommendations. The FSF noted that authorities had expanded their use of colleges of supervisors
to enhance communication among supervisors, "building on existing examples of colleges, such as in the Basel
II framework and in the EU." FIN. STABILITY FORUM, REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM ON
ENHANCING MARKET AND INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE: FOLLOW-UP ON IMPLEMENTATION 24 (2008), available
at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/pr 081009f.pdf Because of the FSF's earlier work on
international financial supervision, the G-20 expanded the FSF's role and created the Financial Stability Board
("FSB") with added responsibilities. Id.
171 G-20, supra note 169, para. 15.
172 Id. paras. 13-16.
173 Finance ministries and central banks from the following nations are members of the Financial Stability
Board: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Italy,
Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain,
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The following international organizations
and standard-setting bodies are also members: the Bank for International Settlements, the European Central
Bank, the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, the World Bank, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the Committee
on the Global Financial System, the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, the International
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Spain, and the European Commission 74-further recognizing the global nature
of the financial system.
The G-20 leaders generally charged the FSB with assessing "vulnerabilities
affecting the financial system," and then with identifying and overseeing
actions to address them. 175 Related to colleges of supervisors, the FSB was
tasked with "promot[ing] co-ordination and information exchange among
authorities responsible for financial stability" and "set[ting] guidelines for, and
support[ing] the establishment, functioning of, and participation in, supervisory
colleges, including through ongoing identification of the most systemically
important cross-border firms." 176 In fact, twenty-eight colleges for systemically
important institutions were in place by April 2009. While there is no official
list of the most systemically important financial institutions, the Financial
Times in November 2009 reported such a list, which follows the article as
Annex B.
Meeting again in September 2009 in Pittsburgh, the G-20 leaders assessed
progress on their previously agreed goals and noted an improvement in the
world economy since they met in London. They expressed their resolve to
ensure that the "regulatory system of banks and other financial firms reins in
the excesses that led to the crisis" and "where reckless behavior and a lack of
responsibility led to crisis, we [the G-20] will not allow a return to banking as
usual." 179 The G-20 declared themselves to be "the premier forum for our
international economic cooperation,"180 replacing the G-7 in that role. The
G-20 noted the substantial progress achieved in establishing supervisory
colleges and reinforcing international cooperation among supervisors.
Furthermore, the G-20 recognized that solving cross-border insolvency of
systemically important financial institutions must occur so that governments
Association of Insurance Supervisors, the International Accounting Standards Board, and the International
Organization of Securities Commissions. Financial Stability Board, Links to FSB Members, http://www.
financialstabilityboard.org/members/links.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).
174 G-20, supra note 169.
175 G-20, Declaration, Strengthening the Financial System-London Summit 1 (Apr. 2, 2009), available
at http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk/resources/en/PDF/annex-strengthening-fin-sysm.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 2.
178 Leaders' Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit, pmbl., paras. 1-6 (Sept. 24-25, 2009), http://www.
pittsburghsummit.gov/mediacenter/129639.htm.
179 Id. pmbl., para. 16.
180 Id. pmbl., para. 19.
181 Id. pmbl., para. 11.
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will be less likely to bail out institutions in order to prevent a collapse of the
financial system. 182
In November 2009, the G-20 finance ministers met in St. Andrews to
review progress thus far. 183 They called for the Basel Committee for Banking
Supervision to issue stronger prudential standards for banks by the end of
2010.184 They reported that more than thirty colleges have been established for
complex financial institutions 85 and requested the Basel Committee, the FSB,
and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors to review the
operations of colleges in 2009.186 The Basel Committee expects to issue
principles and guidelines on the operations of colleges of supervisors in early
2010. 187
CONCLUSION
Colleges of supervisors are not a complete solution for improved
supervision of global financial institutions. However, they potentially could be
a significant improvement in closing regulatory gaps and increasing
information flow among home and host supervisors regarding systemically
important financial institutions. Banks and other financial institutions operate
in global markets, yet financial supervision is still conducted by national
supervisors. The success of integrating European financial markets,
particularly the wholesale markets, facilitated by the common currency, the
euro, has highlighted the need for improved supervisory coordination among
EU supervisors. However, colleges of supervisors are not supranational
agencies. The possibility of a lack of accountability and "finger pointing" in
the event of a bank failure or crisis is still present.188 Participation in a college
of supervisors does not prevent unilateral action by a national supervisor, as
182 Id. pmbl., paras. 10-11.
183 G-20, Progress Report on the Economic and Financial Actions of the London, Washington and
Pittsburgh G20 Summits (Nov. 7, 2009), available at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/
2009progressreportl 107.pdf [hereinafter Progress Report].
184 G-20, Communiqu6, Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, United Kingdom,
para. 6 (Nov. 7, 2009), available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/2009 communique standrews.pdf
185 G-20 Progress Report, supra note 183, at 18.
186 id
187 Id.
18' Dani Rodrik, A Plan Bfor Global Finance, EcONoMST, Mar. 14, 2009, at 80.
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seen in the Dutch government's nationalization of the Dutch operations of
Fortis.189
Colleges of supervisors are not decision-making bodies; rather, they are
designed to share prudential information about a particular financial institution.
The vast majority of communications among bank supervisors is currently bi-
lateral, between two particular supervisors, not through colleges of supervisors.
Typically, the information flows one way, from the host supervisor to the
home supervisor. While the G-20 and the EU proposals on colleges stress two-
way communications between supervisors, full cooperation among supervisors
will be hindered because of the absence of a cross-border insolvency procedure
for financial institutions. Since an orderly way to resolve the claims against a
cross-border financial institution currently does not exist, supervisors must
necessarily focus on protecting their national interests-the rights of residents
within their jurisdiction who may have claims against a failing financial
institution.
Various international bodies have issued principles and statements
regarding the resolution of cross-border financial institutions, but none have
yet been implemented. 190 The EU has issued a Directive on the Reorganization
and Winding Up of Credit Institutions, 191 but the directive principally focuses
on determining which national court has jurisdiction over the proceedings in a
particular case rather than providing a complete, EU-wide system for resolving
in an orderly manner the claims against a failing credit institution.192 Until such
a regime is implemented, national governments are unlikely to relinquish their
sovereignty over the resolution of claims against an insolvent financial
institution. As seen in the creation of the European Banking Authority, the
United Kingdom insisted on placing a brake on EBA decisions because of the
189 See Volz, supra note 72, at A27; Press Release, Ministry of Finance, The State of the Netherlands
Fully Acquires Fortis Bank Nederland, Fortis Insurance Netherlands, Fortis Corporate Insurance and the Fortis
Share in ABN AMRO Holding (Oct. 3, 2008), available at http://www.minfm.nl/english/News/Newsreleases/
2008/10/TheState of theNetherlands fullyacquires Fortis Bank Nederland Fortis Insurance Netherland
sFortis Corporate Insurance and the Fortis share in ABN AMRO Holding.
190 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF TIHE CRoss-BORDER
BANK RESOLUTION GROUP (2009); FIN. STABIITY FORUM, FSF PRINCIPLES FOR CROSS-BORDER
COOPERATION ON CRISIS MANAGEMENT (Apr. 2, 2009), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/
publications/r 0904c.pdf; see also Barry Eichengreen, Out of the Box Thoughts About the International
Financial Architecture (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/09/116, 2009), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09116.pdf.
191 Council Directive 2001/24, The Reorganization and Winding Up of Credit Institutions, 2001 O.J.
(L125) 15 (EC).
192 Id. arts. 10, 20.
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possibility of a member state expending government funds to comply with an
EU decision counter to the member state's public policy choice.19 While
colleges of supervisors may improve the surveillance function over cross-
border financial institutions by improving the flow of prudential information,
true supervisory cooperation will not be realized until a credible, international
regime for the resolution of financial institutions is designed and implemented.
Nevertheless, the creation of colleges of supervisors for all systemically
important financial institutions is an improvement in financial supervision.
Within the EU, the creation of these colleges of supervisors, with coordination
by European supervisory authorities such as the EBA, may be a precursor to
Europen-wide financial services regulation. However, until an international
regime for bank insolvency is established, colleges of supervisors can only
modestly improve the international framework for financial supervision.
193 See, e.g., HIGHLIGHTS-EU Finance Ministers' Meeting, REUTERS, June 9, 2009, http://www.reuters.
com/article/idUSL9600035.
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EURoPEAN UNION FINANCIAL SUPERVISION LEGAL FRAMEWORK
October Barroso appoints From Financial Crisis to Recovery: A European
29, 2008 Larosi&e group. Framework for Action, COM (08) 114 final (Oct.
29, 2008).
February Larosi&e Report JACQUES DE LARoSItRE ET AL., THE HIGH-LEVEL
25, 2008 issued. GROUP ON FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN THE EU 15-27
(2009), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/economyfinance/focuson/crisis/
documents/de larosiere report en.pdf.
March 4, The European Communication for the Spring European Council:
2009 Commission issues Driving European Recovery, vol. 1, COM (09) 114
a COM document final (Mar. 4, 2009).
based on the
Larosi&e Report.
June 9, ECOFIN Council Press Release, The Council of Econ. & Fin.
2009 approves the ESFS Ministers, Council Conclusions on Strengthening
and the ESRC. EU Financial Supervision (June 9, 2009), available
at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms
Data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/108389.pdf.
June 19, The European Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council,
2009 Council approves July 10, 2009, availble at
the ESFS and the http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cmsData/d
ESRC. ocs/pressdata/en/ec/108622.pdf
September Capital Council Directive 2009/111, 2009 O.J. (L 302) 97
16, 2009 Requirements (EC).
Directive
Amendments
published.
September The European Proposal for a Regulation of the European
23, 2009 Commission adopts Parliament and of the Council Establishing a
three regulations European Banking Authority, COM (2009) 501 final
creating European (Sept. 23, 2009);
supervisory Proposal for a Regulation of the European
authorities. Parliament and of the Council establishing a
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions
Authority, COM (2009) 502 final (Sept. 23, 2009);
Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council establishing a
European Securities and Markets Authority, COM
(2009) 503 final (Sept. 23, 2009).
80 [Vol. 24
HeinOnline  -- 24 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 80 2010
SUPERVISORY COLLEGES
October The European Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament
26, 2009 Commission adopts and of the Council Amending Directives
proposed directive 1998/26/EC, 2002/87/EC, 2003/6/EC, 2003/41/EC,
amending sectoral 2003/71/EC, 2004/39/EC, 2004/109/EC,
legislation. 2005/60/EC, 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC, and
2009/65/EC in respect of the powers of the European
Banking Authority, the European Insurance and
Occupational Pensions Authority and the European
Securities and Markets Authority, COM (2009) 576
final (Oct. 26, 2009).
December ECOFIN Council Press Release, 2981 st Council Meeting Econ. & Fin.
2, 2009 approves Affairs (Dec. 2, 2009), available at
regulations creating http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsData/
the European docs/pressdatalen/ecofin/1 1 1706.pdf.
supervisory
authorities.
December The European Council Conclusions EUCO 6/09 of 11 Dec. 2009, at
11, 2009 Council agrees on a 5, available at
general approach on http://ec.europa.eu/internal market/finances/docs/
draft regulations committees/supervision/20090923/
regarding European com2009 501 en.pdf.
supervisory
authorities.
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SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Financial Institution Headquarters Country
Goldman Sachs United States
JPMorgan Chase United States
Morgan Stanley United States
Bank of America Merrill Lynch United States
Citigroup United States
Royal Bank of Canada Canada
HSBC United Kingdom
Barclays United Kingdom
Royal Bank of Scotland United Kingdom
Standard Chartered United Kingdom
UBS Switzerland
Credit Suisse Switzerland
Socidtd Gdndrale France
BNP Paribas France
Santander Spain
BBVA Spain
Mizuho Japan
Sumitomo Japan
Mitsui Japan
Nomura Japan
Mitsubishi UFJ Japan
UniCredit Italy
Banca Intesa Italy
Deutsche Bank Germany
ING The Netherlands
Source: Patrick Jenkins & Paul J. Davies, Thirty Groups on Systemic Risk List, FIN. TIMES (London),
Nov. 30, 2009, at 1.
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